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Abstract When a severely suffering dying patient is dee-
ply sedated, and this sedated condition is meant to continue
until his death, the doctor involved often decides to abstain
from artificially administering fluids. For this dual procedure
almost all guidelines require that the patient should not have
a life expectancy beyond a stipulated maximum of days
(4–14). The reason obviously is that in case of a longer life-
expectancy the patient may die from dehydration rather than
from his lethal illness. But no guideline tells us how we
should describe the dual procedure in case of a longer life-
expectancy. Many arguments have been advanced why we
should not consider it to be a form of homicide, that is,
ending the life of the patient (with or without his request). I
argue that none of these arguments, taken separately or
jointly, is persuasive. When a commission, even one that is
not itself life-shortening, foreseeably renders a person
unable to undo the life-shortening effects of another,
simultaneous omission, the commission and the omission
together should be acknowledged to kill her. I discuss the
legal and ethical implications of this conclusion.
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The question
Of thevarious formsof ‘palliative sedation’, as it is usually called
by now,1 the procedure that raises most ethical and legal con-
cerns is continuous deep sedation: sedation to unconsciousness
that is meant to go on until the patient dies.2 All guidelines and
position statements that have been published in recent years by
professional organisations and consensus groups permit this only
as a last step in a process of titration that in its earlier stages has
failed to relieve the patient’s refractory symptoms. In practice
patientswhodonotwant towait and seewhether the first steps in
that process are really effective are sometimes brought into a
state of coma directly and kept in it until they die.3
The dosage of sedatives normally needed tomake a person
fully unconscious is less than half the dosage standardly used
in anesthetic procedures, and obviously even that last dosage
would not be used if any life-shortening effects could be
expected. Hence by itself deeply sedating a patient in the
medically appropriate way probably does not shorten his life.4
This is stressed bymost guidelines. If a minimal risk remains,
as a few guidelines suggest,5 this need not be a concern for the
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doctor’s conscience, let alone for the criminal law: many of
our daily activities involve such minimal risks.6
But when a patient’s consciousness is lowered, even
moderately, that is to a level short of full unconscious-
ness, he will no longer be able to eat or drink. Hence a
decision has to be made whether or not to start (or,
occasionally, to continue) artificial nutrition and, in par-
ticular, hydration. In some cases the patient will already
have died before it becomes necessary to answer that
question, but in other cases the question will eventually
require an answer. In the case of deep sedation it will in
some countries be decided almost routinely to abstain
from the artificial provision of fluids, in other countries
they will be provided in most cases.7 If it is decided to
withhold fluids and the patient goes on to live for a week
or longer, the real possibility exists that he eventually dies
from dehydration. Even if this outcome may be hastened
by the patient’s illness and general weakening, and the
illness can therefore be viewed as co-determining the
exact moment at which the patient dies, the dehydration is
itself a co-determinant of the moment of death as well.8
Because we are talking about patients in the final stage of
a fatal illness, it is probable that in some cases dehy-
dration may have this life-shortening effect already after a
few days. Should we in these cases think of the doctor as
ending the life of the patient?9
If we consult the existing guidelines we will, remark-
ably, find no anwer to that question. That does not mean
that they are not concerned about the issue. Most guideli-
nes state as a condition for starting deep and continuous
sedation that a patient has a reduced life expectancy,
sometimes specified as ‘hours or days’,10 sometimes as
‘days or weeks’.11 If a more specific upper limit is given, it
is usually put at 14 days.12 Because that is about the
maximum time that people can live without fluids, one may
guess that the reason for this requirement has something to
do with a possible life-shortening effect, and this is con-
firmed in the few cases in which a reason is given.13 So the
guidelines are certainly concerned about the dual proce-
dure, as I will call it, of deep and continuous sedation and
withholding fluids, when the patient has a life expectancy
beyond a certain number of days (4–14), and that concern
seems to be motivated by the possibly life-shortening effect
of that procedure. Nevertheless, the guidelines do not
characterize this dual procedure, when it causes the death
of the patient, as a form of killing.
Should they? From the beginning of the ethical and legal
discussion about ‘terminal sedation’ (as it was then called)
the suspicion has been voiced that this medical procedure
sometimes amounts to ‘slow euthanasia’.14 It has been a
primary concern of the guidelines to refute that accusation.
That is why they stress that even deep continuous sedation,
if done by using appropriate dosages of sedatives, by itself
has no life-shortening effects. Such effects could only
occur when that decision is followed by the decision not to
administer artificial nutrition and hydration. And for this
dual procedure they have addressed the concern by setting
upper limits to the life-expectancy of the patient to be
sedated.
Has this strategy been successful? I will discuss that
question in § 4, concentrating on the different specifica-
tions of the upper limit (roughly between 4 and 14 days)
provided by the guidelines. I will argue that if the upper
limit is meant to prevent the dual procedure from probably
amounting to a form of homicide, it should be put at a
lower level than most guidelines propose. But even if we
accept an upper limit of 14 days, the question remains how
we should describe the dual procedure, morally and legally,
when the life expectancy of the patient exceeds this limit.
Shouldn’t we squarely face the fact that it is probably a
form of homicide, and be consistent in drawing the legal
6 Rady and Verheyde (2010) argue that deep sedation is likely to
depress vital functions in the brainstem with possibly life-shortening
effects. Cf. Leheup et al. (2012). If this is true, some appeal has to be
made to a medical exception on the prohibition of killing, see below §
3.
7 According to Miccinesi et al (2006) it was decided to abstain from
artificial nutrition and hydration in the following percentages of cases
of palliative sedation: 35 % (Italy), 39 % (Flanders), 56 % (Sweden),
60 % (German Switzerland), 64 % (Denmark and the Netherlands).
Later reports of similarly designed research concern the Netherlands
2005 (66 %, van Rietjens et al. 2008), Flanders 2007 (57 %, including
9 % withdrawal during sedation, Chambaere et al. 2010), and the
Netherlands 2010 (79 %, van der Heide et al. 2012). We have no
comparabale data for non-European countries, but for some indicative
data see Bruinsma et al. (2013), p. 42.
8 The immediate cause of the patient’s death probably is heart failure,
caused by a lack of kalium and natrium resulting from dehydration,
V&VN/KNMG (2014), p. 25.
9 What do doctors think? According to Anquinet et al. (2011) 6 out of
28 physicians classified the policy as similar to euthanasia (2) or to
ending of life without request (4). Van Delden et al (2011) asked
doctors to evaluate a vignette-case in which the life-expectancy of the
patient was a month, the patient was sedated and did not receive
artificial hydration, and died after a week. Some respondents observed
that this was ‘a kind of euthanasia’, but only few of them considered
this a reason for a negative assessment of the decision.
10 Braun et al. (2003), Morita et al. (2005) (but elsewhere: days or
weeks), HPNA (2008), EAPC (2009), Fraser Health (2011), NCCN
(2013), section Palliative Sedation. Cf. Svenska La¨karesa¨llskapets
Delegation for Medicinsk Etik (2003), reported in: Førde et al.
(2008): one week.
11 Quill and Byock (2000), De Graeff and Dean (2007), Dean et al.
(2012).
12 NWA (2001), KNMG (2009), NHPCO (2010), Zorgnet Vlaan-
deren (2012). Cf. Morita et al. (2005): 2–3 weeks.
13 NEC (2006), NHPCO (2010).
14 Brody (1993), Craig (1994), Billings and Block (1996), Orentli-
cher (1997), Gauthier (2001), Battin (2008).
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and moral consequences of that insight? In § 2 I will argue
that we should. In § 3 I will discuss the legal meaning of
this conclusion, and consider in particular whether the
doctor who has committed this ‘offence’ -as it will be
considered in all jurisdictions, at least prima facie- has any
legal defenses. Finally, in § 5 I will first ask how the
guidelines could be updated to take my conclusions into
account. I will then go on to argue that if we do not want to
update them because of the price we have to pay for such
updating, we are committed to recognize the legitimacy of
at least one form of physician-assisted death.
As this outline of my argument shows, it is not my aim
in this paper to arrive at a final moral evaluation of the
cases in which the dual procedure, on my view, amounts to
a kind of homicide. There could still be considerations that
can be appealed to in order to justify them, or some of
them, as many people believe that other forms of physi-
cian-procured or -assisted death can be justified. Con-
versely, I certainly do not want to argue in favour of a
policy of always providing fluids.
What do I mean by ‘homicide’? One can kill someone
by accident, but homicide refers to the non-accidental
causing of the death of another human being. This can still
be done negligently or recklessly. But if a person has a life-
expectancy of more than 2 weeks, it is to be expected that
she will die from dehydration if she doesn’t eat or drink. A
doctor who deeply sedates her and doesn’t provide her with
artificial nourishment and hydration should be considered
to know this. Hence his action is neither negligent nor
reckless.
So we are talking about a kind of homicide that is
characterized by foresight. In addition to this cognitive
element a volitional element is involved in homicide: that
you clearly foresaw the death of the other person didn’t
motivate you to abstain from the action. In that sense you
can be said to have endorsed the result. However, you do
not need to have intended it. As we will see (§ 3), in some
legal systems and according to some moral views intention
is relevant for the classification and evaluation of a homi-
cide. But it is not required for considering it a homicide to
begin with. To quote the classical case, if you arrange for a
ship or an airplane to be blown up by dynamite in order to
pocket the insurance money, you will not intend the death
of the crew, but only endorse it as a, possibly unwelcome,
side-effect of executing your plan. But that you will
commit a homicide is beyond dispute.
To characterize an action as an act of killing or a
homicide is not by itself to condemn it, for it is possible for
a homicide to be, all things considered, morally and legally
justifiable. ‘A permissible killing’ is not an oxymoron. On
the other hand, the classification is always relevant for the
moral and legal evaluation of the action. The action is at
least in need of a justification.
My argument will be fairly complex but the basic point
is a simple one. Deep sedation until death is a way to
prevent extreme suffering at the end of life that is seen by
many as an alternative to all forms of physician-assisted
death. It often is such an alternative, though even in those
cases it is an open question which alternative is to be
preferred. But in other cases the patient’s life could pre-
dictably be extended by providing artificial nutrition and
hydration. If in those cases it is decided not to provide
these, for whatever reason, this dual procedure is not an
alternative to all forms of physician-assisted death. It is a
form of physician-assisted death.
‘Slow euthanasia’?
When is it unproblematic to start continuous deep sedation
without administering any fluids? The first observation that
should be made in finding an answer to this question is that
in each dying process there comes a point at which the
patient spontaneously stops eating and drinking because he
loses the craving for it. That is a normal part of dying that
should always be respected. To start artificial hydration in
such a case is an unnecessary prolonging of the dying
process, and may induce additional forms of suffering, for
example by causing or increasing oedema, ascites or
bronchial secretions.15 Hence it may not only be futile but
even cruel treatment. If sedation begins when this point has
already been reached, it is obvious that artificial hydration
should not even be considered, even when we assume that,
as a result of deep sedation, it will no longer cause
suffering.
Some guidelines suggest that in almost all cases in
which continuous deep sedation is decided upon, the
patient has already spontaneously stopped taking fluids.16
That contention is open to doubt,17 but even if it is true, the
few cases left are worth discussing. For even if we may
assume that in these cases the patient’s body will soon start
resisting any further intake, as long as that point has not
been reached it is an open question whether or not the dual
procedure may shorten his life. And a killing is a killing,
even if it occurs only a few minutes before the moment at
which the person would have died from ‘natural’ causes.
It is a constantly recurring theme in the guidelines that
the decision to start or withhold the artificial provision of
food and fluids has to be made on independent grounds.
Neither decision should be automatically implied in the
15 Sutcliffe and Holmes (1994), KNMG (2009), p. 36 with further
references.
16 KNMG (2009), Zorgnet Vlaanderen (2012).
17 Known data about surviving time after sedation has been started
(see footnote 38) seem to contradict it.
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decision to start sedation.18 This makes sense as long as the
patient has not become fully unconscious. Even at mod-
erate levels of unconsciousness she may still experience
feelings of hunger and thirst, or suffer from a dry mouth on
the one hand, whereas providing food and drink may cause
its own forms of suffering (for example resulting from
obstipation) on the other.19 In such cases it is true that these
effects should be balanced against each other. But as soon
as the patient is in a state of coma, either as the final
outcome of titration or as the result of a non-titrating pol-
icy, such balancing makes no sense anymore. For the
patient, we assume, does not experience anything at all and
hence does not suffer. The only reason we could then have
for providing fluids is that death from dehydration is
thereby prevented.20 If that reason is not a valid one, we
should always abstain from providing food and fluids, once
we have decided to start deep sedation until death. No
further balancing of reasons is needed.
The Dutch and Flemish guidelines and a few others take
the view that in such cases artificial hydration should,
indeed, always be withheld or withdrawn because it is to be
considered futile.21 It is futile because for a patient who has
permanently, if not irreversibly, lost consciousness, it
doesn’t matter in which condition she is, not even if she
fully dries out.22 But how can a treatment be futile that
prolongs her life, or at least prevents it from being short-
ened? In that judgment it is presupposed that merely being
alive has no value of its own for the living person, if that
life isn’t the vehicle of other goods, a conscious and not too
painful experience of the world to begin with.23 On this
assumption mere biological life cannot be good for you, if
you do not have and never again will have a point of view
from which you can endorse (or, for that matter, deny) that
evaluation.
Personally I share this view, but it should be observed
that even in the secularized societies of the Netherlands and
Flandres it is not shared by everyone. According to an
alternative view, mostly held on religious grounds, mere
biological life is by itself a basic human good,24 and
therefore always to be protected, at least by ‘ordinary
means’. And artificial hydration is not an ‘extraordinary
means’, if it prolongs life and doesn’t cause any suffer-
ing.25 In a pluralist society this is a view that should be
respected. Patients may therefore legitimately request
artificial hydration, in some religious communities (and in
less seculartzed societies) it may legitimately be the de-
fault, and in some religious hospitals the standard.
If this alternative view is correct, there might be a direct
argument to the conclusion that failing to provide artificial
nutrition and hydration to a sedated patient amounts to
killing her, when she has a life-expectancy beyond the
maximum. Consider a doctor who fails to give antibiotics
to a patient with pneumonia who is otherwise perfectly
healthy, and thereby causes the patient to die. Even though
this is failing to act rather than acting, it is commonly seen
as homicide, because the doctor has a duty of care to his
patient. On this view causing death by failing to provide a
non-futile treatment has to be considered homicidal.
I will not try to assess this argument, for what I want to
focus on, is a different set of arguments. That artificially
administering fluids is a futile procedure, when its only aim
can be to prolong mere biological life, is an equally
respectable view.26 This view, anyway, is the starting-point
of the most plausible, and hence for me the most chal-
lenging argument that can be given to support the con-
clusion that the dual procedure never amounts to killing,
even if it results in an earlier death. That is the argument
that I will scrutinize in the remainder of this section.
The argument proceeds as follows. There is no problem
with sedation, even to full unconsciousness, because it has
no life-shortening effects by itself. There is no problem
with abstaining from artificial hydration either, because it
is only a form of allowing to die, and the treatment may
18 Quill and Byock (2000), Cowan and Palmer (2002), HPNA (2008),
Morita et al. (2005), NEC (2006), De Graeff and Dean 2007, EAPC
(2009), NHPCO (2010).
19 For extensive discussions of the benefits and burdens involved see
De Graeff and Dean (2007), p. 76–77, Gurschick et al. (2014) As
regards the balance of benefits and burdens it turns out that the
available evidence does not allow us to draw any general conclusion.
Cf. Good et al. (2008).
20 KNMG (2009), p. 37, is inconsistent on this point, first stressing
that deeply sedating the patient ends her suffering, and then asserting
that artificial hydration can prolong or exacerbate suffering, e.g. by
causing edema or ascites. Let me add that for esthetic reasons it may
be desirable to moisten the patient’s lips.
21 KNMG (2009), Neitzke et al. (2010), Zorgnet Vlaanderen (2012),
NCCN (2013).
22 ‘‘One of the most difficult situations is where deep, permanent
sedation is given to a patient who is expected to survive for more than
one week. Some would argue that, in this situation, dehydration may
hasten death. Others would argue that giving fluids would neither
prevent death, nor make it more comfortable, but merely prolong the
dying process. There is no evidence to support either view.’’ De
Graeff and Dean (2007), p. 76. But as regards their empirical content,
both views are correct, and fully compatible.
23 The ‘neutral container’ view of the value of life, Kagan (2012),
258ff, cf. Raz (2001), ch. 3.
24 This has most prominently been defended by Germain Grisez,
Joseph Boyle and John Finnis in many works, e.g. Finnis et al. (1987).
In their view biological life even is a fundamental good that cannot be
out-balanced by any other fundamental goods.
25 Cf. IACB (2012), referring to Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith (2007).
26 De Graeff and Dean (2007), NEC (2006), EAPC (2009). Cf. the
debate about ending artificial feeding of patients in a persistent
vegetative state, as in the famous case Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland
(1993) AC 789 HL. (Or, rather, an Unresponsive Wakefulness
Syndrome, cf. von Wildt et al. 2012).
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properly be considered futile. Neither of these decisions is
a form of killing. And so the combination of the two cannot
be a form of killing either.27
Is this a valid argument? If it is, the guidelines are
mistaken in stipulating a maximum life expectancy at all.
For even in cases in which we could expect the patient
eventually to die from dehydration rather than from his
illness, that would not be a problem. Indeed, it would not
be a problem to sedate patients, e.g. with MS or Hunting-
ton’s disease, without administering to them any fluids,
even if they still have a life expectancy of several years.
But the argument is fallacious. Suppose that of two
actions, for example both consisting of the injection of a
certain amount of muscle relaxants, neither has a lethal
effect by itself, but the combination has. Knowingly fol-
lowing a policy consisting of both actions surely amounts
to killing. This much is obvious. Actually doing the first
action with the intention to do the second is already con-
sidered a crime by the law, whether or not the second
action will be performed. But even when the first action has
been done without this intention, clearly it is impermissible
to go on and do the second.
Does it make a difference to the plausibility of the
argument that in the sedation case we are talking about the
combination of an action and an omission? Consider the
following analogy. Someone wants to get rid of his enemy,
but in order not to be liable to prosecution for murder, he
first sedates his victim to unconsciousness and then sees to
it that no food or drink is being provided to him. The victim
dies after 2 weeks. Of course the scheme will be unsuc-
cessful, and the criminal convicted of murder, for his two
sub plans (to sedate and to avoid the administering of food
and drink) only make sense as constitutive elements of one
plan: to bring about the death of the victim.
On being confronted with a similar counter-example
Torbjo¨rn Ta¨nnsjo¨ suggests that even if the policy of our
criminal is morally on a par with murder, strictu senso it
isn’t a form of killing.28 If the law considers it to be
homicide, it is using a legal fiction. On his view the policy
consists of an action of taking away someone’s liberty and
then allowing her to die from hunger and thirst. But if he is
right, one doesn’t kill a person either by throwing her into
the sea from an airplane. That policy also consists of an
action: displacing the victim into the sea, and a failure to
act: allowing her to drown, and neither the action nor the
omission is a killing by itself.
It could be objected that the combination of the two is a
killing in this case because the process which, if not
interrupted, will end the victim’s life (drowning), is initi-
ated by the killer; it is only when one hasn’t initiated the
process which ends her life that one can be said to merely
allow her to die. On that view a person who stops eating
and drinking does not kill herself either, she only allows
herself to die from an independent process, to which we are
all subjected, of dying from lack of food and drink. We
only don’t notice that natural process because we routinely
block it by our actions. That view is controversial itself.29
But even if it would be correct, sedating a person is quite
another matter, for it means actively disabling the person to
block that ‘natural’ process herself. If you don’t compen-
sate for that by taking over the blocking, you are thereby
killing her. Hence, by sedating a person with a more than
minimal life expectancy you are killing that person, unless
you artificially provide her with food and drink, just as you
would kill her by throwing her into the sea, unless you took
active steps to get her out. Such actions are incomplete
killings which are completed by ‘allowing nature to take its
course’. The action and the abstaining are successive ele-
ments of a single policy which has someone’s death as its
foreseeable effect.30
It is true that in many cases the doctor would have
decided to start continuous deep sedation even if in that
case he had been obliged to start administering fluids as
well. That first decision can therefore truly be seen as
independent of the second one, the decision to withhold
hydration.31 That second decision, however, certainly is
not made independently of the first one, and it is this
second decision which, therefore, should be seen as part of
a single procedure which should be evaluated as a whole.
Similarly, if we throw a person into the sea from an air-
plane for some independent, maybe even legitimate reason,
for example to lighten the falling airplane, and only then
decide not to drop the lifejacket that she needs to bring
herself into safety, we are still killing that person.
A standard reply to this line of reasoning is that artificial
nutrition and hydration are medical actions that can only be
started with the informed consent of the patient (or his
representative), which he is fully authorized to refuse.
According to this objection the argument about futility is a
red herring; what we should say instead is that continuous
deep sedation is justified by the consent, given by the
patient to to a medically indicated treatment, and
27 The argument has most explicitly been stated by Ta¨nnsjo¨ (2004a).
It is implied by all authors who suggest that the decision to abstain
from providing artificial fluids should be judged in the same way as
other decisions to withhold or withdraw treatment, e.g. Williams
(2001), Lewis (2008), p. 359, Gevers (2002), p. 365, Delbeke (2013),
p. 144. Guidelines taking that position include AMA (2008), EAPC
(2009), and the guidelines mentioned in footnote 21.
28 That counter-example came from Kuhse (2004), p. 61: Frieda
putting her kitten into a box and deliberately leaving it there without
food and water until it dies.
29 For criticism see den Hartogh (2014).
30 Orentlicher (1997), Kuhse (2004), Van Delden (2013), 218–227.
31 Delbeke (2013).
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abstaining from artificial hydration by his refusal to have it
administered.32 This argument seems to have convinced
even those authors who most prominently have suggested
that the dual procedure should sometimes be described as
‘slow euthanasia’. It is true that if the patient is not pre-
pared to consent to the provision of artificial hydration
once sedation has started, it is not an option for the doctor
to provide it, whether or not he considers it futile treatment.
But this means that in deciding whether or not to start
sedation, he has to take into account that he will have to
abstain from artificial hydration. When he decides to go on,
even though the patient has a life-expectancy of more than
2 weeks, he still knowingly initiates a course of events that
will cause the death of the patient and at the same time
disables her to prevent that effect from occurring. That
analysis still applies, even though the patient doesn’t want
to prevent that effect from occurring. Hence the doctor
knows that he will probably cause the patient to die by
dehydration, and therefore, by following the dual proce-
dure, will probably kill her, albeit it with her consent.33
Similarly if you throw someone into the sea with his
consent, knowing that he will then refuse to be rescued,
you are still causing his death by drowning, albeit on his
request. It is still the same ‘salami-slicing technique’34 to
consider the two decisions independently of each other.35
The analogies I have used in this section (incarceration,
throwing a person into the sea) might suggest that I argue
for a strong normative conclusion. But, as I pointed out
already at the end of § 1, that is not the case. By saying that
the dual procedure should sometimes be recognized to be a
kind of homicide, I do not mean to exclude the possibility
that it can be justified. The only normative conclusion that I
am prepared to draw at this point is that, in order to avoid
moral and legal condemnation, the doctor should be able to
offer an adequate justification.
The legal argument
In § 2 I have argued that a patient who dies of dehydration
as a result of the dual procedure, has been killed by his
doctor. The doctor can morally and legally be held
responsible for this outcome, if it could ex ante have been
predicted with sufficient probability. What is the legal
meaning of this finding? It is difficult to discuss this
question on a fully general level because of the bewildering
amount of structural divergence between laws of homi-
cide.36 Some jurisdictions recognize ending someone’s life
on his explicit request as a separate crime, besides murder
and manslaughter, others don’t. Conceptions of mens rea
differ widely: in most European jurisdictions what matters
is foresight of death as a causal consequence of one’s
action, not whether this consequence is strictly intended,
but in common law countries the intention of the defendant
may also be relevant, though in very different and not
always very clear ways. In some countries the consequence
must have been virtually certain for a classification as
‘murder’ to be applicable, in others a substantial proba-
bility is sufficient, but even these jurisdictions may dis-
agree about wat counts as a substantial probability.37 To
differentiate murder from manslaughter (or first and second
degree murder) premeditation is sometimes essential, but
even if it is, the term has not always the same meaning: in
some US states it requires some time spent in deliberation,
in others it doesn’t.
Nevertheless, in spite of all this variation, we can be
sure that if the patient actually dies as a result of dehy-
dration, and this has been foreseen, it is a case of homicide,
however it is to be classified further. If the patient has
consented to both elements of the procedure, it will be a
case of ending a person’s life on his explicit request in
countries in which this is a separate crime (for example:
Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway). In
many other countries or states it will be a case of murder,
but in some countries (e.g. Singapore, Australia) the ex
ante probability of the outcome will not be enough to
warrant that description. In those countries the proper
classification will be manslaughter (or second degree
murder). Finally, in some countries (e.g. France, the UK) a
lower degree of probability will be enough for murder, if
32 Orentlicher (1997), Hallenbeck (2000), Cowan and Palmer (2002),
Cantor (2006), Quill et al. (2009), Delbeke (2013), Holm (2013),
p. 232. Note again that, if the argument would be valid, it would
justify the dual procedure, irrespective of the life-expectancy of the
patient.
33 As for the patient, if she has consented to the sedation and refused
to consent to artificial hydration, she has by implication consented to
the dual procedure.
34 Van Delden (2013), p. 219.
35 Suppose that a patient decides to end her life by stopping eating
and drinking, and as part of this plan refuses artificial nutrition and
hydration, regardless of whether or not she will be sedated. In that
case her refusal is an independent decision. If during that process a
doctor decides to start deep sedation, could this amount to homicide?
My answer is: yes, when by sedating the patient he disables her to
change her mind. But suppose that the patient gets into a delirium
when she starts losing consciousness. If we should consider stopping
eating and drinking a form of suı¨cide (cf. footnote 29), the sedation
should, I suggest, then be seen as a kind of assistance, which, in legal
systems with a general prohibition of assisting suicide, might require
a special legal defense.
36 Horder (2007).
37 For example, dolus eventualis (death as a result is merely possible,
but the possibility is ‘willingly embraced’) is enough for murder in
Germany and the Netherlands, but not in France or the UK.
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death as a consequence is not merely foreseen but strictly
intended.
It should be recognized, however, that in any concrete
case it will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove that
the patient did not die, at the actual moment he did, from
his fatal illness alone. And for a conviction virtual certainty
is required. For the same reason the risk of prosecution run
by the doctor will also be low. In any such case, however, it
is still probably true that, by implementing a dual proce-
dure, when the patient had a life-expectancy beyond the
upper limit, the doctor killed her patient. Because this
probability was predictable ex ante, in many countries the
dual procedure would at least amount to an attempted
homicide, even if I am not aware of any physician ever to
have been prosecuted on that score. It may be an attempted
homicide, even when in actual fact the patient unexpect-
edly died after a few hours or days only.
That the dual procedure probably amounts to homicide
in some form, when the life expectancy of the patient
exceeds some upper limit, is a morally and legally relevant
fact, even if any actual offence in this area will almost
certainly fail to lead to prosecution and conviction.38 Prima
facie it justifies the prohibition of the dual procedure in this
case, as it is stated by almost all guidelines. But by using
the qualifier ‘prima facie’ I still want to leave it open
whether any adequate justification can be provided for
lifting the prohibition in some cases.
If both the patient’s underlying illness and his dehy-
drated condition are both necessary factors in the deter-
mination of the exact time of his death, we have a case of
concurrent causation. One additional way in which systems
of criminal law differ from each other concerns the way
they deal with this phenomenon, and I cannot fully exclude
the possibility that one or the other particular doctrine of
concurrent causation might provide the doctor with a legal
defense.39 To that extent my legal argument in this section
can perhaps be defeated. But it is hard to see how such a
legal oddity can correspond to a distinction with any moral
significance. If you give a drug to a person, knowing that it
has no lethal effects on any person of normal health, but
has such effects on this particular person on account of a
specific illness he is suffering from, surely you are fully
responsible for the death of that person.
Are any other legal defenses open to the doctor in such
cases? And if they are, do these options reflect morally
significant facts? Three possibilities are worth considering.
1. In the Benelux-countries the law itself contains an
exception to its prohibition of murder (Belgium), c.q.
of taking someone’s life on his request (the Nether-
lands). However, the exception only applies to a doctor
who has reported his action to a regional or national
review committee, and has satisfied a number of
substantial and procedural requirements of careful
action. If the doctor has failed to report, in considering
his case the public prosecution and eventually the court
will still check his behaviour against these require-
ments. In the present case they will then normally have
to conclude that the doctor has not asked an indepen-
dent consultant to give his judgment of the case. More
importantly, they will probably conclude that he has
not used the medically appropriate means for ending a
person’s life on his request. So, even if the fact that he
ended the life of his patient will not necessarily be
considered punishable by itself, the way in which he
did it probably will be.40
2. In all countries the law already recognizes one
exception to the prohibition of killing, to which only
doctors can appeal. This concerns the hastening of
death as a predictable side-effect of medical actions
justified by their palliative aim, usually the use of
morphine.41 The exception can be interpreted in two
ways. In medical ethics and in some common law
jurisdictions the doctor is supposed to be justified by
the fact that he did not strictly intend the death of the
patient, hut only took his death into account as a
probable and proportionate side-effect.42 This justifi-
cation is then usually considered a special application
of a more general Doctrine of Double Effect. In other
countries, including most European ones on the Calais
38 The following data about surviving time have been reported: the
Netherlands 2005: 4 % survival of 1–2 weeks, 2 % of more than
2 weeks (van Rietjens et al. 2008), Belgium 2007: 6 % 1–2 weeks,
3 % more than 2 weeks (Chambaere et al. 2010), UK 2007: 8,3 %
more than 1 week (Seale 2010), the Netherlands 2010: 2 %
1–2 weeks, 1 % more than 1 week (Van der Heide et al. 2010. The
drop in the Netherlands between 2005 and 2010 can be ascribed to the
publication of the KNMG guideline in 2005. Unfortunately, these
figures don’t differentiate between cases in which artificial hydration
has and has not been provided.
39 Cf. footnote 52 below.
40 The Dutch guideline has been developed in 2005 by the Royal
Dutch Society of Medicine (KNMG) in response to a paper of the
Director of Public Prosecutions arguing that the dual procedure might
be a kind of homicide, de Wijckerslooth (2003). After the guideline
had been published, the Director announced (too quickly to my mind,
see § 4) that no doctor who has complied with the guideline will be
prosecuted, Griffiths et al. (2008 p. 61). Unfortunately the legal status
of actions not satisfying the requirement of the maximum life-
exectancy has been left undefined since then.
41 Even though the present consensus is that the medically appro-
priate use of morphine for palliative reasons has no life-shortening
effects either. As I have stated it, the exception is a special case of a
wider medical exception, that is certainly needed to justify continuous
deep sedation. Otherwise it would be a form of battery.
42 Actually the legal position is often either more complex or less
clear or both than this formulation suggests. English law in particular
is both opaque and ambiguous, see Price (1997), Ashworth and
Holder (2009), p. 238, Williams (2007), ch. 1, Lewis, p. 350.
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side of the Channel, this is not a possible justification,
because all that is required as the mental state
component of criminal behaviour is foresight and
endorsement. In these countries what matters instead is
whether a medically recognized indication for action,
e.g. the need to alleviate severe suffering, was
available to the doctor, whether or not he actually
acted on it. In German law, for example, he is then
supposed to be justified by necessity, in other countries
the ‘medical exception’ is a justificatory ground sui
generis, whether it is explicitly recognized as such by a
statute or court decision or not.
It is fairly common in the guidelines and in the literature
to appeal to the medical exception, or rather to the Doctrine
of Double Effect, in order to justify palliative sedation on
its own, sometimes even when the authors deny that, if
properly done, it can have any life-shortening effects at
all.43 But sometimes the appeal is made for the more
specific case of the dual procedure.44 If successful, the
appeal might in particular show why, on the one hand, we
need to stipulate a maximum life-expectancy, but, on the
other, can permit ourselves to specify a relatively high
maximum. For one essential element of the exception is a
proportionality requirement: an unwanted side-effect is
acceptable, but the cost should not be too high. Presumably
that has been the argument for the two-weeks threshold in
the Dutch and Flemish guidelines.
Whether this appeal succeeds, however, depends on the
reasons for withholding artificial nutrition and hydration.
That it is futile treatment, as these two guidelines suggest,
is not an acceptable reason. In this case it is only the
decision to sedate that is justified by its palliative aim, and
dehydration is not an unavoidable side-effect of that
decision. It is easily possible to prevent the occurrence of
the ‘side-effect’ of the dual procedure as a whole: by
administering fluids.45 That doesn’t endanger the palliative
aim of the sedation. But if the shortening of the patient’s
life is morally so problematic that you are prohibited to
intend it, it cannot be ‘futile’ to administer fluids in order to
prevent that effect.46 Hence the burden of proof is on the
supporter of the appeal to the Doctrine to provide us with
other reasons why we cannot consider artificial hydration.
Only if he succeeds can he say: I intend to alleviate the
patient’s suffering (by deep and continuous sedation), I
intend to respect those other reasons, and I accept the
shortening of the patient’s life as an unavoidable side-
effect.
In § 2 I argued that the ‘salami-slicing’ techniques
which I discussed in that section fail because by sedating a
person one disables her to prevent the natural effects of the
withdrawal of artificial hydration from occurring.47 One
could object to that argument that in sedating the doctor
didn’t have the intention to create that disabling effect.
That would, according to this objection, be the crucial
difference with the other cases I mentioned: incarcerating
someone and failing to feed her, or dropping someone into
the sea and allowing her to drown. In many countries this
difference would, it is true, legally not be relevant, because
the law is not interested in the intention of the doctor. But
his intention could be morally relevant nevertheless, as the
law seems to recognize in some other countries. That can
only be the case, however, if the effect is unavoidable
without giving up the justifying aim of the whole proce-
dure. If you can avoid the effect, but don’t, and you have
no stronger reasons than that it would be futile to try, you
cannot protest that you didn’t intend that effect.
The maximum life-expectancy
So if we consider the dual procedure of permanent sedation
to full unconsciousness and withholding artificial nutrition
and hydration, there is a certain threshold of life expec-
tancy beyond which we cannot deny that the procedure
probably amounts to a form of homicide The term ‘prob-
ably’ in this conclusion refers to a residual factual, not to
any legal uncertainty.
What should the threshold be? As we have seen the
professional guidelines give varying answers to this ques-
tion, roughly in a range from 4 to 14 days.
Doctors’ predictions of the life expectancy of patients
are known to be very unreliable beyond 3–4 days. Even a
prediction of three days survival is pretty fallible; at the
very least one should require the prediction to be confirmed
by an independent expert. The most reliable sign for a short
life-expectancy is the spontaneous reduction of the intake
of fluids to less than circa 300 cc a day. Beyond 3–4 days,
even a consensus judgment of several doctors has hardly
any predictive value at all. For some forms of cancer the
normal trajectory of the illness offers some footholds for a
prognosis, but that prognosis will still not be accurate
enough to differentiate between a life expectancy of 1, 2 or
43 E.g. Cowan and Palmer (2002), HPNA (2008), Lo and Rubenfeld
(2005), De Graeff and Dean (2007), 76–77, AMA (2008), Boyle
(2004), Rousseau (2004), Levy and Cohen (2005), Carr and Mohr
(2008), Baumann et al. (2011), Leheup et al. (2012).
44 Sulmasy and Pellegrino (1999), NCCN (2013), De Graeff and
Dean (2007), den Hartogh (2006), McIntyre (2014), Van Delden
(2013).
45 Orentlicher (1997), G. Williams (2001), Raus et al. (2013, p. 199),
Holm (2013).
46 Holm (2013).
47 Or by appealing to some principle of double effect, see below. See
on the authority of the guidelines Delbeke (2013), at p. 135, cf.
footnote 40.
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3 weeks. In the case of other fatal illnesses estimations of
life-expectancy are even less reliable.48 It is usually poin-
ted out in this regard that doctors tend to overestimate
rather than underestimate survival time.49 But that is only a
statistical truth which leaves too much space for individual
exceptions to be comfortable. In addition, doctors may
have special biases in making their estimations in these
cases, which should be of special concern.
Even if reliable estimations were possible, an upper
limit of 14 days is certainly too high. As we have seen, it is
based on the assumption that it normally takes about
2 weeks to die from dehydration. That is already at the
upper end of the known range,50 but this is a range that
applies to healthy people who start from a normal hydra-
tion status, not to patients who are in the final stage of a
fatal illness.51 Patients in that category may be expected to
die from dehydration after 3–4 days.
When artificial hydration is provided, estimations of life
expectancy are unreliable beyond 3–4 days. When it is
withdrawn and the patient does not die from his illness
within 3–4 days, he may be expected to die from dehy-
dration. Combining these data we appear to have reason to
stipulate an upper limit of 3–4 days. (Remember that we
cannot justify a few additional days by appealing to a
proportionality requirement.) It seems even arguable that in
all cases in which the patient has not spontaneously
reduced the intake of fluids, by withholding artificial
hydration from him after deep sedation we run a substantial
risk of shortening his life.
Suppose a doctor, having sedated his patient and having
withdrawn artificial hydration, is prosecuted for ending the
life of his patient and it can, exceptionally, be proved that
this patient has died from dehydration. If the patient had a
life expectancy of more than 3–4 days, but less than
2 weeks, could the doctor appeal to some of the profes-
sional guidelines, in particular in countries in which
guidelines, stipulating an upper limit of 2 weeks, have been
adopted by a national professional organisation of doctors
(the Netherlands and Flandres)?52 Although this will cer-
tainly help him, it should not exempt him, if the reasoning
of those guidelines has itself been fallacious, for example
by adopting any of the salami-slicing techniques which I
discussed in § 2.
Conclusion
In 1997 the USA Supreme Court denied the existence of a
constitutionally guaranteed right to physician-assisted
death in two landmark decisions.53 One of the arguments
members of the Court used was that dying patients did not
need to go through a period of intolerable suffering which
could not be alleviated, because their doctor always had the
option of sedation until death. It does not appear from the
opinions of the judges that any of them realized that it is
fairly common practice in the USA not to provide fluids to
a dying patient who has been deeply sedated. As David
Orentlicher pointed out in that same year, this means that in
an unknown number of cases—actually probably a small
number- the procedure the Court recommended, as it is
actually practised, cannot be distinguished from the pro-
cedure it did permit to be forbidden.54
As we have seen, it will nearly always be impossible to
establish in any concrete case with sufficient certainty that
the dual procedure has actually hastened a patient’s death.
That this is ex ante probable in all cases in which the life-
expectancy of the patient exceeds a certain threshold, could
have been a reason for the law to stipulate a specific pro-
hibition, but this, as far as I know, has never been done by
any statute or court decision. No doctor, as far as I know,
has ever been convicted for killing on request, murder,
manslaughter, attempted murder or any other crime against
life for following the dual procedure when his sedated
patient has died after, let’s say, 10 or 15 days. The law
consistently leaves it to the profession to regulate this
behaviour. And, indeed, many professional guidelines
point out some threshold, but mostly in fairly vague terms,
without explicating the reason for this requirement, and
without ever making explicit how we should describe
actions which do not respect it.
In most countries this means: euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide are legally forbidden, because of the
sanctity of life, the vocation of the doctor to heal and not to
kill, and/or because of the possibilities of abuse that
allowing these actions is perceived to imply, but this par-
ticular form of killing by the doctor is left in a legal and
moral limbo. All justifications of the prohibition of
48 See Van Delden (2013) for a more detailed analysis.
49 Glare et al. (2003). The overestimation is on average 30 %, and the
larger the longer the expected time of survival.
50 Chabot (2008), p. 28.
51 Van Delden (2013), p. 221.
52 A Dutch doctor, for example, could argue, as follows. He could
concede that the dual procedure he used had a life-shortening effect,
but insist that the patient’s underlying illness has also been a
necessary factor in the determination of the moment of death. He
could then argue that, of these two concurrent causes, the death of the
patient could only be ‘reasonably attributed’ to the patient’s illness,
because his own actions had fully met the requirements of the
KNMG-guideline. Cf. Rozemond (2009).
53 Washington v Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 22558 (1997), opinions of
Justices O’Connor and Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg. The
argument that sedation until unconcsiousness is ‘covert assisted
suicide’ is rejected in Vacco v. Quill S Ct. 2293 (1997).
54 Orentlicher (1997).
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euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are thereby
compromised. If, for example, it is feared that the legali-
sation of euthanasia would lead to patients being killed
because doctors or hospitals don’t expect sufficient remu-
neration for continued treatment, it is obvious that it will be
much easier for them to achieve that aim by acting on a
policy which does not require the consent of the patient in
all cases, which is not monitored and controlled in any
way, either by required consultation or by required
reporting, and in which the causal nexus between the
policy and the patient’s death is normally hard to prove.
Similar considerations apply when the fear is that family-
members coveting the inheritance will manipulate the
patient and/or the doctor into arranging a physician-as-
sisted death.
In the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg the legal
situation is almost equally unclear: in addition to the
exception to the prohibition on killing someone on his
request, explicitly stated in the law, another exception is
not clearly foreclosed, even when it applies to cases which
do not satisfy the legal requirements of due care. The
reason for this cannot be that the rationale for these
requirements does not fully apply to these cases.
As far as the guidelines are concerned, in all these
countries clarity and consistency could be achieved by
updating them in two ways:
1. The maximum life-expectancy for allowing the dual
procedure should be reconsidered. As I have argued, a
case can be made for stipulating that continuous deep
sedation should only be considered when the patient
has already spontaneously stopped eating and drinking.
If it is preferred to stipulate a maximum life-
expectancy of three or four days, expert confirmation
by an independent consultant of the estimated life-
expectancy should be required in all those cases in
which the patient has not yet spontaneously stopped
eating and drinking.
2. If this upper limit is foreseeably exceeded, it should be
made explicit that the dual procedure in such a case
will probably amount to some form of homicide, even
if this will predictably be hard to prove. The relevant
kind of homicide, whatever it is, will be one prohibited
by the law, not covered by the usual ‘medical
exception’. Only in the Benelux-countries it could
conceivably be covered by a second exception to the
prohibition of killing, but only if the relevant require-
ments of due care have been satisfied.
We have seen that the guidelines use several argumen-
tative strategies in order to escape that conclusion: that we
should consider the justifiability of continuous deep seda-
tion and the withholding of hydration independently of
each other, that the patient in any case has the legal right to
refuse treatment, including artificial hydration, that the life-
shortening effect is merely an unavoidable side-effect of a
decision aimed at the alleviation of the patient’s severe
suffering. I hope to have shown that all these arguments are
fallacious, as well as inconsistent with the very requirement
regarding the maximum life-expectancy itself. But the very
fact that these arguments have been made so commonly
shows that the conclusion that the dual procedure some-
times amounts to homicide is unwelcome.
It is easy to understand why. Cases occur in which it is
an undeniable benefit for dying patients who have not
already spontaneously stopped drinking, or have a life-
expectancy beyond 3 or 4 days, to be deeply sedated until
their death.55 But these same patients will often prefer not
to have fluids administered to them, and this preference is
also fully understandable. They may consider the uncer-
tainties surrounding doctors’ assessments of the depth of a
coma and the fact that the possibility of unwanted re-
awakening cannot fully be excluded.56They may also
consider how exhaustive it normally is for relatives (and
medical staff) to wait for the end in such cases.
For these reasons an argument can be made that doctors
should retain the option of choosing the dual procedure, up
to a maximum life-expectancy of 2 weeks, or even
beyond.57 This would require the law at least to explicitly
create a second ‘medical exception’ to the prohibition of
killing. But if the law is going to permit only one form of
euthanasia, it is hard to see why it should be the slow one.
The same reasons the patient may have for preferring
continuous deep sedation without hydration he may cite for
preferring euthanasia in its standard form. Which reasons
can be given for not allowing it? The patient has nothing to
gain, and both the patient and in particular his relatives
have a lot to lose by this restriction. If the sanctity of life or
the vocational integrity of the doctor is at stake in one
practice, it is equally at stake in the other, and if the pos-
sibilities of abuse can be controlled in one case, as the
guidelines obviously assume, they can equally be con-
trolled in the other.
The appeal to a medical exception to the prohibition of
killing which I considered in the last section presupposes
that shortening the life of the patient, even in his actual
state, is an unwelcome effect. The argument from futility I
discussed in § 2 presupposes that it is at least an indifferent
effect. But I have argued that if we permit the dual pro-
cedure in cases in which the life-expectancy of the patient
55 Either because they are suffering from refractory symptoms -the
only reason recognized by the guidelines- or for other reasons, see den
Hartogh (forthcoming).
56 Noreika et al. (2011), DeSchepper et al. (2013). Morita (2005),
Anquinet et al. (2011) (8 out of 28 patients woke up due to
insufficient medication).
57 Cf. Cellarius (2008).
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exceeds three or four days, we actually imply that the effect
is welcome. This assumption should be openly
acknowledged.
If physician-assisted death in the particular form of the
dual procedure is recognized as legal in some way, some
regime of substantial and procedural requirements should
be in place, perhaps similar to the regime of the Dutch and
Belgian euthanasia laws. In these countries it should be
made clear that these requirements apply to the dual pro-
cedure when the patient’s life-expectancy exceeds the
upper limit. This will also mean that, in the case the patient
survives longer than expected, it may still be an open
option to use muscular relaxants in order to hasten his
death. One important procedural requirement that is mostly
not made at present is that the doctor who considers the
dual procedure has to consult an independent palliative
expert. These experts should give their informed opinion
about the availability of alternative ways of alleviating the
patient’s suffering, both pharmacological and non-phar-
macological, about possible burdens these alternatives
involve, and in particualr about the life expectancy of the
patient.58
The dual procedure of starting continuous deep sedation
and withholding hydration should be seen for what it is: a
form of killing, in all cases in which the life-expectancy of
the patient is beyond the maximum now recognized by the
guidelines, but arguably also in some cases below that
maximum, at least when it is put higher than at three or
four days. Many guidelines at present stipulate a higher
maximum, and all guidelines fail to clarify the moral and
legal status of actions that do not respect the maximum. It
is inconsistent at the same time to defend a general legal
ban on euthanasia.
One person’sModus Ponens is the other person’sModus
Tollens, and from the beginning the argument that the dual
procedure at least sometimes amounts to euthanasia has
been used in both ways.59 There are arguments on both
sides, some of which I have mentioned. But though my
position will be clear, it has not been my concern in this
paper to argue for it.
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